Hidden Number Problems in Fiat-Shamir based Post-Quantum Signatures

Abstract

Schnorr and (EC)DSA signatures famously become completely insecure once a few bits of the random nonce are revealed to an attacker. In this work, we investigate whether post-quantum signature schemes allow for similar attacks. Specifically, we consider three Fiat-Shamir based signature schemes: Dilithium (lattices), LESS (codes) and CSI-FiSh (isogenies). Analogous to the attacks on Schnorr and (EC)DSA, we assume knowledge of some bits of the commitment randomness used in the underlying ID protocol. Such attacks belong to the broader class of Hidden Number Problems.

In the case of LESS, we give an efficient attack that requires knowledge of a single bit of the randomness in roughly 20000 signatures to completely recover the secret key. Our attack is based on the observation that knowledge of a single bit in the randomness is enough to distinguish secret key entries from random ones. Since for proposed parameters there are at most 548 candidates for each entry, we can enumerate all candidates and use the distinguisher to recover the secret key one entry at a time.

For Dilithium we are able to recover the whole secret key using at most 1792 signatures when either 3 or 4 least significant bits of the randomness are known (depending on the parameter set). Here the attack is based on the simple observation that knowledge of the least significant bits of the randomness immediately yields a linear relation in the secret key.

For CSI-FiSh, on the other hand, we obtain only an inefficient attack that requires exponentially many signatures. However, we prove that this attack is essentially optimal. Thus, our results show that CSI-FiSh comes equipped with an inherent leakage resilience. The argument easily extends to a wider class of signature schemes, but notably does not apply to the predecessor SeaSign.

Type
Jonas Meers
Jonas Meers
Fourth year PhD Student

My research interests include post-quantum public key cryptography.